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I.   INTRODUCTION
The admissibility of prior consistent statements has long been a
difficult and contentious issue.1 The issue impacts a wide variety of
significant cases, including sex-abuse cases,2 criminal drug cases,3
civil rights cases,4 and many other actions, both criminal and civil.
Several factors contribute to the difficulty of determining when a
prior consistent statement should be admitted. Included among
                                                                                                                 
* Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Middle District of North Caro-
lina. B.A., University of North Carolina, 1961; LL.B., University of North Carolina, 1963.
** Member, North Carolina State Bar. Associate, Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Winston-
Salem, North Carolina. B.S.E.E., University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 1990; M.S.E.E.,
University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 1992; J.D., cum laude, Wake Forest University,
1994. Former judicial clerk to the Honorable Alvin A. Schall, Circuit Judge, United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Former judicial clerk to the Honorable Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,
Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.
1. See, e.g., Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 103 (8th Cir. 1969) (noting that
aspects of the issue have “plagued the courts for centuries”); Michael H. Graham, Prior
Consistent Statements: Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Critique and
Proposal, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 575, 576 (1979) (“In modern litigation the use of prior consis-
tent statements has become exceedingly confused and complex.”); Annotation, Admissibil-
ity of Previous Statements by a Witness out of Court Consistent with His Testimony, 41
L.R.A. (N.S.) 857, 858 (1913) (stating that the admissibility of prior consistent statements
“is as perplexing as any in the law of evidence”) [hereinafter 41 L.R.A. (N.S.)].
2. See, e.g., Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696, 696-710 (1995), aff’g 3 F.3d 342
(10th Cir. 1993); United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1448-51 (8th Cir. 1993).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1096-98 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1567-68 (11th Cir. 1991);
Washington v. Vogel, 880 F. Supp. 1534, 1540 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
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them is a tension between the theoretical analysis of the issue and
the recognition that such an approach sometimes does not comport
with the practicalities of a jury trial. This tension, combined with
the desire for “bright-line” rules, resulted in the development of
common-law evidence rules that sometimes needlessly prohibited
the admission of evidence that would assist the jury in its delibera-
tions.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted in 1975,5 sought to bring
stability and provide guidance to evidence law in the federal courts.
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence exempts from the
definition of hearsay certain prior statements made by a testifying
witness who is subject to cross-examination concerning the state-
ment.6 Thus, prior consistent statements within Rule 801(d)(1)(B)’s
scope are admissible as substantive evidence to show the truth of
the matter asserted. The prior statement of a witness is exempted
from the definition of hearsay if the statement is “consistent with
the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or im-
plied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive.”7 Unfortunately, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) has given
rise to much confusion regarding several issues.
In Tome v. United States ,8 the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed one of the principal points of confusion associated with Rule
801(d)(1)(B): whether prior consistent statements made by the de-
clarant after the alleged fabrication or improper influence or motive
arose are admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The vast majority of
courts addressing this question under the common law held such
statements inadmissible. These courts reasoned that such state-
ments were of no value because they could be the product of the
same improper influence charged at trial.9 In a 5-4 decision, the
Supreme Court reasoned that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) codified the com-
mon-law rule and held that a declarant’s prior consistent statement
may be admitted into evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) only if the
statement was made before the alleged fabrication or improper in-
fluence or motive arose.10 In other words, the Court held that pre-
motive, but not postmotive, prior consistent statements are admis-
                                                                                                                 
5. See Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L.
No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1296 (1975).
6. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
7. Id.
8. 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995).
9. See infra Part II.B.1.
10. See Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 700.
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sible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B).11 This time-line admissibility rule is
known as the premotive rule.
Some commentators have criticized the Tome Court’s analysis
and conclusion.12 These commentators address the Court’s holding
that the Federal Rules of Evidence codified the common-law premo-
tive rule. None of these commentators, however, addressed the vital
issue: the premotive rule itself.
This Article examines the admissibility of prior consistent state-
ments, concentrating on the premotive rule. The Article concludes
that the per se, time-line premotive rule codified in Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
is overly restrictive in some instances. The rule can hamper the
jury’s fact-finding mission by placing an often crucial factual deter-
mination where it does not belong—in the hands of the trial judge.
Although a per se premotive rule compels the correct result in the
vast majority of situations, it does not sufficiently take into account
the ebb and flow of an individual’s motives and emotions, the infi-
nite array of factual situations in which the issue might arise, or the
strength of the jury’s ability to weigh evidence. A more flexible ap-
proach, one that takes account of the realities of a jury trial, is needed.
This need can be met by amending the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Part II of this Article provides background and an historical dis-
cussion of the admissibility of prior consistent statements at com-
mon law. Part III examines the admissibility of prior consistent
statements under the Federal Rules of Evidence, focusing on the
premotive rule. Part IV describes the Tome case, including a discus-
sion of the Supreme Court’s majority and dissenting opinions. Part
V suggests that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should be amended, and sets forth
some issues that the amendment should address.
                                                                                                                 
11. The terms “premotive” and “postmotive” are employed throughout this Article as
short-hand for, respectively, before and after “recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive” (the language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and many common-law courts).
12. See, e.g., Robert P. Burns, Foreword: Bright Lines and Hard Edges: Anatomy of a
Criminal Evidence Decision, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 843 (1995); Eileen A. Scallen,
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee
Notes, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1283 (1995); Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical
Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717 (1995); Andrew E. Taslitz, In-
terpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a Politically Realistic Her-
meneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329 (1995); Christopher A. Jones, Note, Clinging to His-
tory: The Supreme Court (Mis)Interprets Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) as Contain-
ing a Temporal Requirement, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 459 (1995).
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II.   THE COMMON LAW AND PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
A.   Development of the Common-Law Rule
Through the early 1700s, courts admitted witnesses’ prior consis-
tent statements as substantive evidence without limitation.13 These
courts reasoned that such statements effectively corroborated wit-
nesses’ in-court testimony.14
Around 1675, common-law courts began to question the admis-
sibility of hearsay.15 However, common-law rules prohibiting the
admission of hearsay were not prevalent until the mid-1700s.16
The hearsay rule’s development impacted the admissibility of prior
consistent statements. In the early 1700s, litigants began making
hearsay objections to the admission of prior consistent statements.17
In response, some courts began prohibiting the admission of prior
consistent statements for their truth and content.18 These courts,
however, continued to allow the admission of such statements during
direct testimony for independent, corroborative, nonsubstantive use,
even though the witness had not yet been impeached.19 Eighteenth-
century evidence commentator Sir Geoffrey Gilbert explained the pre-
vailing thought on the matter: although “hearsay [evidence may not
be] allowed as direct evidence, . . . it may be in corroboration of a wit-
ness’s testimony to show that he affirmed the same thing before on
other occasions, and that the witness is still consistent with himself.”20
In the early 1800s, litigants began objecting to prior consistent
statements on additional, other-than-hearsay grounds, including
relevancy.21 These objections brought about the common-law rule
that a witness’s testimony could not be bolstered until the witness’s
credibility was attacked.22 Courts recognized that bolstering evi-
dence offered before impeachment provided no value.23 Courts thus
reasoned that prior consistent statements offered before impeach-
                                                                                                                 
13. See 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1123, at 254 (Chadbourn Rev.
1972); John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 446-47
(1904).
14. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1123, at 254.
15. See 5 id. § 1364, at 18.
16. See 5 id.
17. See 4 id. § 1123, at 254.
18. See 4 id. § 1123, at 254-55.
19. See 4 id. § 1123, at 254; 5 id. § 1364, at 20.
20. GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 108 (photo. reprint, Garland Publishing,
Inc. 1979) (1754). For an interesting look at Gilbert’s evidentiary work, see Judy M. Cornett, The
Treachery of Perception: Evidence and Experience in Clarissa, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 165 (1994).
21. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1123, at 254.
22. See Graham, supra note 1, at 577-78; see also United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas.
349, 352 (C.C.D. Me. 1858) (“No principle in the law of evidence is better settled than” the
rule that direct testimony supporting a witness’s credibility “is not to be heard except in
reply” to an opposing party’s impeachment attempt).
23. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1124, at 255.
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ment were no more probative than in-court statements and were
unnecessarily cumulative.24 Indeed, most courts agreed that “a
falsehood may be repeated as often as the truth.”25 Based on this
analysis, courts held prior consistent statements inadmissible when
offered during direct testimony, and admitted such statements only
after impeachment26 of the declarant witness’s credibility, and then
for only rehabilitative, and not substantive, purposes.27 This became
the accepted and prevailing common-law rule.28
Beginning in the mid-1900s, several commentators advocated the
alteration of the hearsay rules to allow admission of a witness’s
prior statements as nonhearsay. Scholars taking such a position in-
cluded John H. Wigmore,29 Edmund M. Morgan,30 Charles T.
McCormick,31 and Jack B. Weinstein.32
The Uniform Rules of Evidence, promulgated in 1953, and the
Model Code of Evidence, promulgated in 1942, incorporated these
scholars’ position.33 Rule 63(1) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
provided that prior statements were not hearsay if the declarant
was present at the trial and was available for cross-examination.34
                                                                                                                 
24. See 4 id.
25. E.g., State v. Parish, 79 N.C. 610, 613 (1878).
26. “Impeachment” includes “attempted impeachment” as applicable throughout this
discussion. What constitutes sufficient “impeachment” to satisfy the requirements of Rule
801(d)(1)(B) and the common law is beyond the scope of this Article.
27. See, e.g., Conrad v. Griffey, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 480, 491-92 (1850); Ellicott v. Pearl,
35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836); Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. 63 (1871).
28. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1124.
29. See 3A id. § 1018, at 996 (discussing self-contradiction and observing that “the
whole purpose of the hearsay rule has been already satisfied”); see also California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1970).
30. See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 192 (1948). Professor Morgan reasoned that “[w]hen the
Declarant is also a witness, it is difficult to justify classifying as hearsay evidence of his
own prior statements. This is especially true where Declarant as a witness is giving as
part of his testimony his own prior statement.” Id.; see also Edmund M. Morgan, The
Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1937).
31. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 224, at 458 (1954); 2 CHARLES
T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 251, at 117 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]; Charles T. McCormick, The Turncoat
Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEX. L. REV. 573, 575-88
(1947).
32. See Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 333
(1961) (describing the “practical absurdity in many instances [of] treating the out of
court statement of the witness himself as hearsay”).
33. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promul-
gated the Uniform Rules of Evidence. See generally Symposium on the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 479, 479-646 (1956).
The American Law Institute promulgated the Model Code of Evidence. See MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942). Professor Morgan served as reporter for the Model Code,
while Dean Wigmore served as chief consultant. See id. at iii-iv.
34. The Uniform Rules of Evidence defined as nonhearsay “[a] statement previ-
ously made by a person who is present at the hearing and available for cross-
examination with respect to the statement and its subject matter, provided the state-
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The Model Code of Evidence contained the same provision.35 How-
ever, this position was not well-received. Only a few jurisdictions
adopted the original Uniform Rules of Evidence.36 No jurisdictions
adopted the Model Code of Evidence.37 The common-law rule de-
scribed earlier remained the accepted rule regarding prior consistent
statements.
B.   Circumstances Required for the Admission of Prior Consistent
Statements Under the Common-Law Rule
Although the accepted common-law rule continued to govern,
courts disagreed on what circumstances must precede the admission
of a prior consistent statement. Courts’ decisions in this regard gen-
erally depended on (1) what the impeachment charged or attacked, (2)
the method by which the impeachment was accomplished, and (3) the
purpose for which the prior consistent statement was offered.
1.   Charge or Attack
Courts overwhelmingly agreed that prior consistent statements
were admissible to rebut impeachment that charged recent fabrica-
tion or improper influence or motive.38 Such a charge can be ac-
complished by several means of impeachment, including opposing
counsel’s questions and the introduction of prior inconsistent state-
ments.
                                                                                                                 
ment would be admissible if made by declarant while testifying as a witness.” UNIF. R.
EVID. 63(1) (1953). In 1974, the Uniform Rules of Evidence abandoned this position and
generally conformed to the Federal Rules of Evidence. See UNIF. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)
(1974).
35. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503 (1942). “Evidence of a hearsay declaration
is admissible if the judge finds that the declarant (a) is unavailable to testify, or (b) is pre-
sent and subject to cross-examination.” Id.
36. See 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5005, at 91-92 (1977).
37. See 21 id. § 5005, at 88-89. As a result of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s adoption
of the Model Code of Evidence, the Nebraska Legislature repealed the court’s rulemaking
power and rejected the Model Code. See 21 id. § 5005, at 89 & n.80 (citing Edmund M.
Morgan, The Future of the Law of Evidence, 29 TEX. L. REV. 587, 599 (1951)).
38. See, e.g., Conrad v. Griffey, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 480, 491-92 (1850); Ellicott v. Pearl,
35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836); Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 1931);
Dwyer v. State, 145 A.2d 100, 109-10 (Me. 1958); Commonwealth v. Retkovitz, 110 N.E.
293, 297-99 (Mass. 1915); State v. Flint, 14 A. 178, 184-86 (Vt. 1888); see also Annotation,
Admissibility, for Purposes of Supporting Impeached Witnesses, of Prior Statements by Him
Consistent with His Testimony, 75 A.L.R.2D 909, 935-50 (1961) (citing cases) [hereinafter
75 A.L.R.2D]; Annotation, Admissibility, for Purpose of Supporting Impeached Witness, of
Prior Statements by Him Consistent with His Testimony, 140 A.L.R. 21, 78-129 (1942)
(citing cases) [hereinafter 140 A.L.R.].
Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger note that “[p]rior to the federal rules, the courts
were virtually unanimous in allowing” prior consistent statements to be used following
impeachment by this method. 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S
EVIDENCE ¶ 801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-149 to -150 (1996).
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Moreover, the vast majority of courts followed a time-line admis-
sibility rule for prior consistent statements. Courts held that prior
consistent statements made before, but not after, the alleged fabri-
cation or improper influence or motive arose were admissible.39 This
time-line rule is known as the premotive rule.
Courts following the premotive rule reasoned that prior consis-
tent statements made before the existence of the alleged motive di-
rectly rebut such impeachment by demonstrating that the declar-
ant’s in-court statement is consistent with out-of-court statements
made when the declarant is not alleged to have had an improper
motive to falsify his or her statement.40 Conversely, these courts
noted, prior consistent statements made afterwards could be the re-
sult of the same improper influence that generated the in-court
statements, and therefore are of little value.41
In nearly all of these jurisdictions, a prior consistent statement’s
admissibility was decided in the same manner as other evidentiary
questions that require predicate showings for admissibility. The
trial judge determined whether a prior consistent statement was
premotive or postmotive based on evidence presented to the jury up
to the time the statement’s admission was sought, evidence pre-
sented to the judge out of the jury’s presence, or a combination of
these two means. The judge’s determination of this question would
normally dictate the admissibility of the statement.42
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, rec-
ognizing the strength and propriety of the jury’s fact-finding ability,
adopted a different, deferential standard of admissibility. The Sec-
ond Circuit held that if it is “reasonably possible for the jury to say
that the prior consistent statements did in fact antedate the motive
disclosed on the cross-examination, the court should not exclude
them.”43
A small minority of courts held that prior consistent statements
made after the alleged fabrication or improper influence or motive
arose also could be admissible.44 These courts reasoned that post-
                                                                                                                 
39. See, e.g., Ellicott, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 439; Ryan v. UPS, 205 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir.
1953); People v. Walsh, 301 P.2d 247, 250-51 (Cal. 1956); People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710,
711-12 (N.Y. 1949); see also 75 A.L.R.2D, supra note 38, at 944-46 (citing cases); 140
A.L.R., supra note 38, at 117-21 (citing cases).
40. See sources cited supra note 39.
41. See sources cited supra note 39.
42. See sources cited supra note 39.
43. United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1956), rev’d on other
grounds, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); see also United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 673 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); United States v. DiLorenzo, 429 F.2d 216, 220 (2d Cir. 1970); Greenway v.
State, 626 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Alaska 1980) (Matthews, J., concurring).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1972); Hanger
v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104-05 (8th Cir. 1968); Copes v. United States, 345 F.2d 723,
725-26 (D.C. Cir. 1964); State v. George, 30 N.C. 324, 328 (1848).
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motive prior consistent statements and the circumstances surround-
ing such statements are relevant to the jury’s evaluation of the de-
clarant’s motive and testimony.45
A witness’s memory is sometimes attacked as faulty. Such an at-
tack can be accomplished by opposing counsel’s questions, prior in-
consistent statements, negative evidence, and other impeachment
means.46 Several courts held prior consistent statements admissible
following an attack on a witness’s memory.47 These courts reasoned
that such statements indicate the witness’s “true belief”48 or demon-
strate the witness’s “accuracy of memory.”49 Moreover, these courts
reasoned that such statements are “necessary to give the jury a
complete basis upon which to judge the credibility” of the witness’s
testimony.50 Given this rationale, many of these courts required that
the prior consistent statement be made soon after the event in ques-
tion.51
A few courts held prior consistent statements inadmissible in like
circumstances.52 These courts did not explicitly set forth their ra-
tionale in this regard. It appears, however, that their reasoning was
                                                                                                                 
45. See, e.g., Gandy, 469 F.2d at 1134-35; Copes, 345 F.2d at 725.
46. It is important to note that an attack on a witness’s memory often, but not al-
ways, includes a charge of recent fabrication.
47. See, e.g., Applebaum v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 472 F.2d 56, 61 (2d
Cir. 1972); Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 198 n.6 (2d Cir. 1970); United States
v. Keller, 145 F. Supp. 692, 695-97 (D.N.J. 1956); People v. Basnett, 8 Cal. Rptr. 804, 810-
11 (Ct. App. 1960); Thomas v. Ganezer, 78 A.2d 539, 542 (Conn. 1951); Openshaw v. Ad-
ams, 445 P.2d 663, 668-69 (Idaho 1968); Cross v. State, 86 A. 223, 227 (Md. 1912); People
v. Mann, 212 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Slocinski, 197 A. 560, 562
(N.H. 1938); Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246, 250 (1878); see also Graham, supra note 1, at
605-06 (noting that prior consistent statements properly support such an attack “if the
statement was made shortly after the event in question”); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, su-
pra note 31, § 47, at 178 n.18 (“If the witness’s accuracy of memory is challenged, it seems
clear common sense that a consistent statement made shortly after the event and before he
had time to forget, should be received in support.”); 75 A.L.R.2D, supra note 38, at 929-30
(citing cases); 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 48-49 (citing cases). Courts hold similarly to-
day. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Admissibility of Impeached Witness’ Prior Consis-
tent Statement—Modern State Civil Cases, 59 A.L.R.4TH 1000, 1023 (1988 & Supp. 1994)
(citing cases) [hereinafter 59 A.L.R.4TH]; Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Admissibility of
Impeached Witness’ Prior Consistent Statement—Modern State Criminal Cases, 58
A.L.R.4TH 1014, 1051-53 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (citing cases) [hereinafter 58 A.L.R.4TH].
48. Openshaw, 445 P.2d at 669.
49. Thomas, 78 A.2d at 542 (quoting Jones, 80 N.C. at 250) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
50. Applebaum, 472 F.2d at 62.
51. See, e.g., id. at 61-62; Jones, 80 N.C. at 250; see also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 31, § 47, at 178 n.18.
52. See, e.g., People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85, 90-91 (1874); People v. Kinney, 95 N.E. 756,
757 (N.Y. 1911); Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Stephens, 79 N.E. 235, 236-37 (Ohio 1906);
Green v. State, 110 S.W. 929, 929-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908); see also Graham, supra note
1, at 605-06; 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 47-48. The common-law trend throughout the
twentieth century, however, was to admit prior consistent statements following an attack
on a witness’s memory.
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based on a very strict adherence to the general common-law rule
prohibiting the use of hearsay.53
Many courts construed an attack on a witness’s memory to be a
charge of recent fabrication. Thus, these courts admitted prior con-
sistent statements to rebut such attacks under the well-recognized
rule admitting such statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrica-
tion.54 These courts took an expansive view of the term “fabricated.”
Courts recognized “fabricated” to mean “fabricat[ion] to meet the
exigencies of the case.”55 However, “fabricated” normally indicates a
conscious and purposeful falsification.56 “Fabricate” is defined as “to
make up for the purposes of deception.”57
Although an attack on a witness’s memory may include a charge
of purposeful deception, such an attack does not always do so. For
example, an attack charging inaccurate memory by showing the
witness’s simple forgetfulness or confusion may be made without
charging purposeful deception. Common-law courts, however, often
seemed to treat “recent fabrication” as a term of art, including non-
purposeful deception within its definition.58
Other courts, in admitting prior consistent statements to rebut
attacks on a witness’s memory, recognized some distinction between
such attacks and a charge of recent fabrication. These courts rea-
soned that such attacks created situations that were “sufficiently
analogous” to the cases admitting prior consistent statements to re-
but a charge of recent fabrication.59
2.   Other Types of Impeachment
Common-law courts largely agreed that impeachment methods
that did not charge a recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive, or attack the witness’s memory, did not open the door to the
introduction of prior consistent statements.60 Some methods received
near-uniform treatment, while others resulted in disagreement.
Nearly all courts held prior consistent statements inadmissible to
rebut impeachment by mere contradiction evidence.61 If mere con-
                                                                                                                 
53. See, e.g., Kinney, 95 N.E. at 757 (“It is sufficient to state somewhat dogmatically
that this evidence [a prior consistent statement regarding identification] was utterly in-
competent, for this is so baldly the law that there is no chance for debate or discus-
sion.”).
54. See sources cited supra note 47.
55. E.g., People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710, 711 (N.Y. 1949).
56. See Graham, supra note 1, at 582-83.
57. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 443 (1989).
58. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 38-39.
59. E.g., Thomas v. Ganezer, 78 A.2d 539, 542 (Conn. 1951).
60. Professor Michael Graham refers to this type of impeachment as “naked im-
peachment.” Graham, supra note 1, at 594.
61. Mere contradiction evidence usually takes the form of a witness whose testimony
portrays a different version of the matter about which a previous witness testified. Many
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tradiction justified the admission of prior consistent statements,
“then the witness who had repeated his story to the greatest number
of people would be the most credible.”62
Most courts, noting that a person of bad moral character could
easily repeat a story, held prior consistent statements inadmissible
to rebut impeachment by evidence of the declarant’s bad moral
character.63 Following the same general reasoning, nearly all courts
held prior consistent statements inadmissible to rebut impeachment
by evidence of the declarant’s bad reputation for veracity.64
Courts split as to whether prior consistent statements were ad-
missible following impeachment of the witness by prior inconsistent
statements alone.65 A majority of courts held prior consistent state-
ments inadmissible following such impeachment.66 These courts
generally reasoned that “since the self-contradiction is conceded, it
remains as a damaging fact, and is in no sense explained away by
the inconsistent statement.”67 A number of courts, however, held
                                                                                                                 
courts decline to admit prior consistent statements to rebut such impeachment. See, e.g.,
Inman Bros. v. Dudley & Daniels Lumber Co., 146 F. 449, 456 (6th Cir. 1906); Evans v.
State, 22 S.E. 298, 298-99 (Ga. 1894); People v. Katz, 103 N.E. 305, 312-13 (N.Y. 1913); see
also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1127, at 267; 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 38-42 (citing
cases).
A very small minority of courts, however, ruled such statements admissible following
contradiction evidence. See, e.g., Mallonee v. Duff, 19 A. 708, 708-09 (Md. 1890); State v.
Rhyne, 13 S.E. 943, 943-44 (N.C. 1891); see also 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 42-47 (citing
cases). Dean Wigmore described these courts as “misled.” 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, §
1127, at 267.
62. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1127, at 267.
63. See, e.g., Edwards v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W. 1046, 1047 (Ky. 1911); Lyles v.
State, 239 S.W. 446, 449-50 (Tenn. 1922); Thurmond v. State, 11 S.W. 451, 452 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1889); see also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1125, at 258; 140 A.L.R., supra note 38,
at 34-35 (citing cases). A few courts, however, admitted prior consistent statements to re-
but the impeachment of the declarant’s moral character. See, e.g., State v. Rowe, 4 S.E.
506, 509-10 (N.C. 1887); Zell v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. 258, 267 (1880); see also 140 A.L.R.,
supra note 38, at 35-36 (citing cases).
64. See, e.g., Yoder v. United States, 71 F.2d 85, 89 (10th Cir. 1934); McKelton v.
State, 6 So. 301, 301 (Ala. 1889); Mason v. Vestal, 26 P. 213, 213-14 (Cal. 1891); see also 4
WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1125, at 258; 75 A.L.R.2D, supra note 38, at 927-28 (citing
cases); 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 36-37 (citing cases). A few courts, however, admitted
prior consistent statements to rebut such impeachment. See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 468
P.2d 143, 149 (Kan. 1970); State v. Dove, 32 N.C. 469, 474-75 (1849); 4 WIGMORE, supra
note 13, § 1125, at 258; 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 37 (citing cases).
65. “The admission of prior consistent statements to support a witness impeached by
prior inconsistent statements has plagued the courts for centuries . . . .” Hanger v. United
States, 398 F.2d 91, 103 (8th Cir. 1968). Impeachment by prior inconsistent statement is
also called self-contradiction. See id.
66. See, e.g., Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836); Affronti v. United
States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944); Gelbin v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 62 F.2d 500,
502 (2d Cir. 1933); American Agric. Chem. Co. v. Hogan, 213 F. 416, 420-21 (1st Cir. 1914);
Baker v. People, 209 P. 791, 793 (Colo. 1922); Chicago City Ry. v. Matthieson, 72 N.E. 443,
444-45 (Ill. 1904); see also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1126; 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at
49-59 (citing cases). Much of the case law recognized this as the “general rule.”
67. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1126, at 259.
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that prior consistent statements were admissible following im-
peachment by prior inconsistent statements alone.68 These courts
generally reasoned that “if a contradictory statement counts against
the witness, a consistent one should count for him.”69
Moreover, some courts reasoned that prior consistent statements
are admissible following impeachment by a prior inconsistent state-
ment alone if the prior consistent statement is related to an expla-
nation or denial of the alleged prior inconsistent statement.70 In
other words, courts held that prior consistent statements could be
admitted to help explain that the previously admitted prior inconsis-
tent statement is incorrect or misleading, or to help explain that the
prior inconsistent statement was simply never made.71 Appellate
courts sometimes answered this difficult question by leaving the de-
cision to the trial judge’s sound discretion.72
This remained the state of the common law regarding prior con-
sistent statements until the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Both state and federal common-law evidentiary rules were
important to federal courts of the time. Before the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the admission of evidence in federal civil
                                                                                                                 
68. See, e.g., Schoppel v. United States, 270 F.2d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 1959); United
States v. Corry, 183 F.2d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1950); Childs v. State, 55 Ala. 25, 28 (1876);
Thompson v. State, 58 N.E.2d 112, 112-13 (Ind. 1944), overruled by Dean v. State, 433
N.E.2d 1172 (Ind. 1982); American Stores Co. v. Herman, 171 A. 54, 55-56 (Md. 1934);
Cross v. State, 86 A. 223, 226-27 (Md. 1912); People v. Purman, 185 N.W. 725, 727 (Mich.
1921); Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. 63, 74-76 (1871); Stafford v. Lyon, 413 S.W.2d 495, 498
(Mo. 1967); Piehler v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 226 S.W.2d 681, 683-84 (Mo. 1950);
Reeves v. Hill, 158 S.E.2d 529, 537 (N.C. 1968); Hale v. Smith, 460 P.2d 351, 353 (Or.
1969); State v. Turner, 15 S.E. 602, 602-03 (S.C. 1892); Kepley v. State, 320 S.W.2d 143,
145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959); State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1957); Russell v.
Cavelero, 246 P. 25, 26 (Wash. 1926); see also Kaneshiro v. United States, 445 F.2d 1266,
1271 (9th Cir. 1971); Sweazey v. Valley Transp., Inc., 107 P.2d 567, 572 (Wash. 1940)
(describing admitting prior consistent statements to rebut prior inconsistent statements as
the minority rule); 140 A.L.R., supra note 38, at 59-65 (citing cases); see generally 4
WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1126, at 258-67.
69. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1126, at 259.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Fayette, 388 F.2d 728, 733-35 (2d Cir. 1968); Newman
v. United States, 331 F.2d 968, 970-71 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d
817, 834 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Lev, 276 F.2d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 1960); Cafasso v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 169 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1948); Affronti, 145 F.2d at 7 (“[I]f some
portions of a statement made by a witness are used on cross-examination to impeach him,
other portions of the statement which are relevant to the subject matter about which he
was cross-examined may be introduced in evidence to meet the force of the impeach-
ment.”); United States v. Weinbren, 121 F.2d 826, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1941); United States v.
Katz, 78 F. Supp. 435, 440 (M.D. Pa. 1948), aff’d, 173 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1949); see generally
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6712, at 461 (interim ed. 1992).
71. See, e.g., Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 1970); Twardosky
v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 A.2d 723, 727 (N.H. 1948); Sweazey, 107 P.2d at 572;
see also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1126, at 260-65; GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 6712, at
461; Graham, supra note 1, at 594-602.
72. See, e.g., Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 103-04 (8th Cir. 1968); National
Postal Transp. Assoc. v. Hudson, 216 F.2d 193, 200 (8th Cir. 1954); Cafasso, 169 F.2d at
453; Affronti, 145 F.2d at 7; State v. Ouimette, 298 A.2d 124, 133-34 (R.I. 1972).
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cases was primarily governed by Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.73 Rule 43(a), enacted in 1938, provided for the ad-
mission of evidence in federal court in civil trials if the evidence was
admissible under federal statute, federal common law or decisions,
or under statutes or rules of the state where the district court sat.74
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provided that
the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal cases was generally
governed by common law.75
III.   THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PRIOR CONSISTENT
STATEMENTS
A.   Prior Consistent Statements and Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence gave rise to a new era of evidence
law. Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 “to se-
cure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceed-
ings justly determined.”76 Moreover, the Rules sought to reduce incon-
sistency and arbitrariness in the admission of evidence in federal
courts.77
Although much of the Federal Rules of Evidence is based on the
Uniform Rules of Evidence,78 the Federal Rules of Evidence did not
incorporate the Uniform Rules of Evidence’s position on prior state-
ments as nonhearsay.79 Instead, the Federal Rules of Evidence gen-
erally adhered to the prevailing common-law hearsay rules.80
                                                                                                                 
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (1938) (amended 1972).
74. See id. Rule 43(a) provided, in pertinent part:
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the
United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of
the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evi-
dence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the
United States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the
reception of the evidence governs . . . .
Id.; see also generally Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a), 5 VAND. L.
REV. 560 (1952).
75. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 (1946). Rule 26 provided, in pertinent part: “The admis-
sibility of evidence . . . shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules
otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.” Id.
76. FED. R. EVID. 102.
77. See William L. Hungate, An Introduction to the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 32
FED. B.J. 225, 228-29 (1973).
78. See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 36, § 5005, at 90.
79. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee’s note (comparing Rule 63(1) of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence with Rule 801(d)).
80. See id.
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Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines “hearsay” as “a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted.”81 Hearsay is generally excluded from evidence under Rule
802.82
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) addresses the admission of prior consistent
statements by removing certain prior consistent statements from the
definition of hearsay. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he declarant testifies at the trial
or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the state-
ment, and the statement is . . . consistent with the declarant’s testi-
mony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against
the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.83
The most important aspect in which Rule 801(d)(1)(B) differs
from the common-law rule governing the admission of prior consis-
tent statements is that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) allows the admission of
statements within its scope for substantive purposes.84 The Advisory
Committee noted that this aspect of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) rejects the
“bulk of the case law” and is a “judgment . . . more of experience
than of logic.”85
Many federal circuits hold that prior consistent statements of-
fered for the limited purpose of rehabilitation, and not for substan-
tive use, are not governed by Rule 801(d)(1)(B).86 Evidence commen-
                                                                                                                 
81. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Rule 801(a) defines a “statement” as “(1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an asser-
tion.” FED. R. EVID. 801(a). Rule 801(b) defines a “declarant” as “a person who makes a
statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(b).
82. See FED. R. EVID. 802. Rule 802 provides that “[h]earsay is not admissible except
as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority or by Act of Congress.” Id.
83. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). Of course, prior consistent statements admissible un-
der Rule 801(d)(1)(B) must still qualify for admission under the relevancy rules. See FED.
R. EVID. 401-03.
84. This is true for all prior statements admitted under Rule 801(d). See FED. R. EVID.
801(d) advisory committee’s note.
85.  Id.
86. See, e.g., Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21 F.3d 721, 729-30 (6th Cir.
1994); United States v. Castillo, 14 F.3d 802, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1449 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 905-06
(3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Bolick, 917 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Roy, 843 F.2d 305, 307 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Colon, 835 F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir.
1987); United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Bowman,
798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 587-88 (2d Cir.
1986), aff’d, 867 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 532-33
(8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399-400 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Juarez, 549 F.2d 1113,
1114 (7th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Jones, 766 F.2d 994, 1004 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding, without discussion, that trial court’s admission of prior consistent statements to
rehabilitate witnesses was not an abuse of discretion); see also United States v. Rubin, 609
F.2d 51, 66-70 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring) (arguing that the limitations on the
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tators agree with this conclusion.87 Courts reason that Rule
801(d)(1)(B) applies only to statements offered for the truth of the
matter asserted.88 Because prior consistent statements offered for
the limited purpose of rehabilitation are not offered for the truth,
these courts reason, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not govern their admis-
sion.89 Some courts state their belief that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence did not alter prior common-law rules in this regard.90 In addi-
tion, some courts reason that admission of such statements furthers
the principle of completeness promoted by Federal Rule of Evidence
106.91 Essentially, these courts hold that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence impart to the trial courts great discretion to determine, under
the rules of relevancy, the admissibility of prior consistent state-
ments offered for the limited purpose of rehabilitation.92
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit holds that “a prior consistent
statement offered for rehabilitation is either admissible under Rule
801(d)(1)(B) or it is not admissible at all.”93 The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, “prior consistent
statements were traditionally only admissible for the limited pur-
pose of rebutting a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive.”94 Examining the legislative history, the court determined
that Rule 801(d)(1)(B)’s “only effect is to admit these statements as
substantive evidence.”95 Therefore, the court concluded, “it no longer
makes sense to speak of a prior consistent statement as being of-
                                                                                                                 
use of prior consistent statements apply only to affirmative evidence), aff’d, 449 U.S. 424
(1981); United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36, 50 n.20 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting but not deciding
the issue).
87. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 251, at 117; WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 36, § 6712, at 461-63; Graham, supra note 1, at 594-604.
88. See, e.g., Engebretsen, 21 F.3d at 730; Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333; Harris, 761 F.2d at
399; Rubin, 609 F.2d at 66-70 (Friendly, J., concurring); United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d
224, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1978); see also White, 11 F.3d at 1449; Bolick, 917 F.2d at 138; Bow-
man, 798 F.2d at 338.
89. See cases cited supra note 88.
90. See, e.g., Quinto, 582 F.2d at 233.
91. See, e.g., Andrade, 788 F.2d at 533; Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333; Harris, 761 F.2d at
400; see also John D. Bennett, Note, Prior Consistent Statements and Motives to Lie, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 787 (1987). Rule 106 provides: “When a writing or recorded statement or
part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at
that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.” FED. R. EVID. 106. Courts have rec-
ognized that this is “not a precise use of Rule 106.” E.g., Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333.
92. See, e.g., Engebretsen, 21 F.3d at 729; Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333.
93. United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1273 (9th Cir. 1989); see also United
States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1470-71 (9th Cir. 1991); Judith A. Archer, Note, Prior
Consistent Statements: Temporal Admissibility Standard Under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(B), 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 759 (1987).
94. Miller, 874 F.2d at 1273 (emphasis added).
95. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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fered solely for the more limited purpose of rehabilitating a wit-
ness.”96
B.   The Premotive Rule Under the Federal Rules of Evidence
The plain language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) makes no express refer-
ence to a time-line premotive requirement. Some commentators
maintain that the term “recent” embodies the premotive rule97 while
others consider the term “recent” superfluous.98 Moreover, none of
the cases examining the premotive rule focus on the term “recent.”
The Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is very short
and makes no express reference to a premotive requirement. The
note states:
Prior consistent statements traditionally have been admissible to
rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive
but not as substantive evidence. Under the rule they are substan-
tive evidence. The prior statement is consistent with the testimony
given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the
door for its admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent
why it should not be received generally.99
Fueled in large part by this lack of explicit direction regarding the
premotive rule from either Rule 801(d)(1)(B) itself or the Advisory
Committee notes, federal circuit courts disagreed on whether Rule
801(d)(1)(B) embodies the premotive rule.
                                                                                                                 
96. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit quoted a treatise on the Federal
Rules of Evidence:
[T]he drafters believed (i) that the principles governing rehabilitation would
remain unchanged by the Rules, (ii) that the rather specific description of cir-
cumstances of admissibility contained in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) reaches all cases in
which prior consistent statements may be received to repair credibility, and
consequently (iii) that this Rule permits the substantive use of every prior
statement which may be received to rehabilitate a witness.
Id. at 1273 n.11 (quoting 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 420, at 195 (1980)).
97. See, e.g., Edward D. Ohlbaum, The Hobgoblin of the Federal Rules of Evidence: An
Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent Statements and a New Proposal, 1987
B.Y.U. L. REV. 231, 246. Professor Ohlbaum reasons that:
[T]he term “recent” . . . purposefully introduces the crucial element of the time
frame during which the alleged motive to lie emerged. If improper influence or
motive is the basis for the intentionally fabricated testimony, “recent” fabrica-
tion requires that the motive occur after the consistent statement was made.
Thus, the phrase “recent fabrication” introduces two elements: first, with re-
gard to “fabrication,” an intentional or purposeful falsification; second, with re-
spect to “recent,” a falsification which results from a motive that developed af-
ter the statement was made.
Id. at 246-47.
98. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 1, at 583.
99.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee’s note.
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At the time of the Tome decision, the federal circuits were closely
split as to this issue. The Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits held that postmotive prior consistent statements
were inadmissible for substantive purposes but were admissible for
the limited purpose of rehabilitation.100 In adhering to the time-line
                                                                                                                 
100. First Circuit: First Circuit case law discussing this issue is sparse. Only one
First Circuit case, United States v. Vest, 842 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir. 1988), examines the issue.
The Vest court determined that the prior consistent statements at issue “were made before
[the declarant] acquired a motive to fabricate,” and thus were admissible. Id. at 1330.
Other prior consistent statements were made after the declarant acquired a motive to fab-
ricate. See id. The court reasoned that these statements were “not hearsay at all” because
they “were not ‘offered . . . to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’ ” Id. (quoting FED. R.
EVID. 801(c)). Thus, these postmotive statements were “not ‘prior consistent statements’
under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).” Id. The First Circuit noted the split in the circuits on
this issue without further elaboration in United States v. Piva, 870 F.2d 753, 759 n.4 (1st
Cir. 1989).
Second Circuit: See United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 587-88 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding prior consistent statement admissible for rehabilitation purposes even if inad-
missible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)); United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986)
(same); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 66-70 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring)
(arguing that standards of admissibility announced in United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d
224 (2d Cir. 1978), should not apply when prior consistent statements are introduced for
purely rehabilitative purposes), aff’d, 449 U.S. 424 (1981); Quinto, 582 F.2d at 234 (litigant
seeking to introduce prior consistent statement “must demonstrate that the . . . statement
was made prior to the time that the supposed motive to falsify arose”); see also United
States v. Castillo, 14 F.3d 802, 806 (2d Cir. 1994) (examining the “Pierre exception” for re-
habilitative purposes); United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he
Quinto requirements were satisfied in this case.”); see also generally Yvette Olstein, Com-
ment, Pierre and Brennan: The Rehabilitation of Prior Consistent Statements, 53 BROOK.
L. REV. 515 (1987) (discussing Pierre, Brennan, Quinto, Rubin, and the law of prior consis-
tent statements in the Second Circuit).
Third Circuit: See United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 904-06 (3d Cir. 1991)
(whether to admit postmotive prior consistent statement is a relevancy matter; when
statement is made postmotive, the statement is not relevant to rebut an implication of re-
cent fabrication, and is therefore inadmissible for substantive purposes; however, postmo-
tive statements offered only for rehabilitative purposes may be admissible); see also United
States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 977 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting, but not reaching, the issue).
Fourth Circuit: See United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135, 138-39 (4th Cir. 1983)
(“[A] prior consistent statement is admissible under the rule only if the statement was
made prior to the time the supposed motive to falsify arose.”); see also United States v.
Bolick, 917 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1990). The Bolick court “assume[d], without deciding,
that the prior consistent statements were admitted as rehabilitation and that they are not
subject to the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B).” Id. The court further noted that the
Fourth Circuit “may have endorsed” the proposition that postmotive prior consistent
statements are admissible for nonsubstantive purposes in United States v. Parodi, 703
F.2d 768 (4th Cir. 1983). Bolick, 917 F.2d at 138 (citing Parodi, 703 F.2d at 785-86 (citing
in turn Rubin, 609 F.2d at 66-70 (Friendly, J., concurring))); see also United States v. Me-
hra, 824 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding without elaboration in face of defendant’s
postmotive rule argument that “[a]dmission of the statement, even if erroneous, presents
no grounds for reversal”) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)); United States v. Dominguez, 604
F.2d 304, 310-11 (4th Cir. 1979) (allowing prior consistent statement for rehabilitation of im-
peached witness); United States v. Weil, 561 F.2d 1109, 1111 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1977) (assuming
that the prior consistent statement was not made before the motive to fabricate existed).
Seventh Circuit: See United States v. Patterson, 23 F.3d 1239, 1247 (7th Cir. 1994)
(explaining that in order to admit prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B),
“the witness must . . . have made the statements before he had a motive to fabricate”)
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premotive rule and denying the admission of postmotive prior con-
sistent statements for substantive use, these courts reasoned that
such statements are not relevant to rebut an allegation of recent
fabrication.101 These courts observed that such statements demon-
strate only that the declarant said the same thing before trial as the
declarant said at trial.102 They noted that the alleged motive to fabri-
cate existed at the time of all of these statements, and that “mere
repetition does not imply veracity.”103 Some of these courts reasoned
that the premotive requirement is not a literal requirement of Rule
801(d)(1)(B), but is a relevancy requirement examined under the
relevancy rules.104
In admitting postmotive prior consistent statements for the lim-
ited purpose of rehabilitation, some of these courts reasoned that
such statements are not hearsay under Rule 801 because they are
                                                                                                                 
(citing United States v. Fulford, 980 F.2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 1992)); United States v.
Davis, 890 F.2d 1373, 1379 (7th Cir. 1989) (to admit prior consistent statements as non-
hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), “the statement must have been made before the declar-
ant had a motive to fabricate”) (quoting United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 342-43
(7th Cir. 1989)); United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 398-400 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[The
postmotive] condition need not be met to admit into evidence prior consistent statements
which are offered solely to rehabilitate a witness rather than as evidence of the matters
asserted in those statements.”); see also Thomas v. United States, 41 F.3d 1109, 1119 n.2
(7th Cir. 1994) (“[The defendant did] not argue that he offered his prior consistent state-
ment merely to rehabilitate his testimony on the stand, that is, not as substantive evi-
dence. Therefore, [the court did] not address whether Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) would en-
compass the admissibility of his prior statement offered for that purpose.”); United States
v. Lewis, 954 F.2d 1386, 1391 (7th Cir. 1992) (setting forth four criteria, including the
premotive rule, that must be met in order to admit a prior consistent statement under
Rule 801(d)(1)(B)).
Eighth Circuit: See United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1450-51 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[T]o
be admitted as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), a prior consistent statement
must have been made before the motive to fabricate came into existence.”) (citing United
States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986)). The Bowman court had stated that
“the better rule imposes a requirement that the consistent statements must come before
the motive to fabricate existed”; however, the court noted, no prejudicial error was shown.
Bowman, 798 F.2d at 338; see also United States v. Roy, 843 F.2d 305, 307 (8th Cir. 1988)
(“Bowman specifically held that prior consistent statements made after the existence of a
motive to fabricate are admissible for rehabilitation . . . .”) (citing Bowman, 798 F.2d at
338); United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 532-33 (8th Cir. 1986) (allowing F.B.I.
agent’s statements to “rehabilitate and support” agent following implied charge of fabrica-
tion). The Andrade court also noted that the Quinto holding was being questioned by the
Second Circuit and cited Judge Friendly’s concurrence in Rubin. See id.; see also United
States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1121-22 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding that the facts did not
support defendant’s argument that prior consistent statements were inadmissible because
they were postmotive).
101. See, e.g., Patterson, 23 F.3d at 1247; Casoni, 950 F.2d at 904; Harris, 761 F.2d at
399; Quinto, 582 F.2d at 233-34.
102. See, e.g., Harris, 761 F.2d at 399; Quinto, 582 F.2d at 234-35.
103. United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting 4
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38, ¶ 801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-100 (1977)); see also White,
11 F.3d at 1450 (quoting same).
104. See, e.g., Casoni, 950 F.2d at 904-05; Harris, 761 F.2d at 399 (citing FED. R. EVID. 402).
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not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.105 Some courts noted
that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not explicitly require the premotive ele-
ment.106 Courts also observed that such statements may be relevant
to the declarant’s credibility.107 They explained that the statements
may demonstrate the context of the impeachment evidence, and may
help the jury weigh the impeachment evidence and thus determine
the extent of the declarant’s credibility.108 Some of these courts also
cite a “doctrine of completeness” promoted by Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 106 in reasoning that the statements are admissible.109
The Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Colum-
bia Circuits held that postmotive prior consistent statements were
admissible for both substantive and rehabilitative purposes.110 These
                                                                                                                 
105. See, e.g., Harris, 761 F.2d at 400; United States v. Juarez, 549 F.2d 1113, 1114
(7th Cir. 1977).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 785 (4th Cir. 1983).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986); Harris, 761
F.2d at 400.
108. See, e.g., Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333; Harris, 761 F.2d at 400; see also GRAHAM, supra
note 70, § 6712, at 461-63.
109. See, e.g., Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333; Harris, 761 F.2d at 400; United States v. Rubin,
609 F.2d 51, 70 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1215, 1252 (7th Cir. 1979);
see also United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 533 (8th Cir. 1986) (“[T]his rehabilitative
use of prior consistent statements is in accord with the principle of completeness prompted
by Rule 106.”); supra note 86 and accompanying text. But see Ohlbaum, supra note 97, at
282 & n.140 (“[T]hese courts have relied on a tortured reading of the ‘rule of completeness’
. . . .”). Courts, too, have noted that this is “not a precise use of Rule 106.” E.g., Pierre, 781
F.2d at 333.
110. Fifth Circuit: See United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 295-96 (5th Cir. Unit B
June 1981) (postmotive prior consistent statement admissible for substantive purposes);
United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284, 289 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) (postmotive prior con-
sistent statement admissible for substantive purposes) (citing United States v. Gandy, 469
F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1972)); see also United States v. Cifarelli, 589 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir.
1979) (noting, but not examining, the issue).
Sixth Circuit: See United States v. Lawson, 872 F.2d 179, 182-83 (6th Cir. 1989)
(“[W]here there are other indicia of reliability surrounding a prior consistent statement
that make it relevant to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive, then the
fact that the statement was made after the alleged motive to falsify should not preclude its
admissibility.”); United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273-74 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting
the Sixth Circuit’s “desire for a more relaxed standard of admissibility under Rule
801(d)(1)(B) and [the court’s] uneasiness with the Quinto decision”) (citing United States v.
LeBlanc, 612 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1980)).
Ninth Circuit: The Ninth Circuit has a somewhat convoluted history on this issue. Re-
cent case law indicates, however, that the Ninth Circuit fits into this category. Cf. 4
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38, ¶ 801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-196 to -198 (putting Ninth
Circuit in premotive requirement category). In United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255 (9th
Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit stated that the premotive “requirement should not be applied
as a rigid per se rule barring all such prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B),
without regard to other surrounding circumstances that may give them significant probative
value.” Id. at 1274. The Miller court reasoned that “a prior consistent statement offered for
rehabilitation is either admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or it is not admissible at all.” Id. at
1273. The Miller court also found this conclusion “consistent with the case law of this circuit.”
Id. at 1273 n.13; see also United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1470-72 (9th Cir. 1991)
(following Miller); cf. Breneman v. Kennecott Corp., 799 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A
prior consistent statement is admissible only if it was made before the witness had a motive
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courts recognized that whether a prior consistent statement is pre-
motive or postmotive may affect the statement’s materiality.111 These
courts, however, rejected a per se, time-line premotive requirement.
These courts reasoned that a postmotive prior consistent statement
may be relevant in some circumstances.112 Some noted that Rule
801(d)(1)(B) does not explicitly state a premotive requirement.113
These courts observed that other, nontemporal factors may indicate
that a postmotive statement is reliable, and thus should be admis-
sible under the Federal Rules.114 These courts also stated that be-
cause the issue is one of relevancy under the Federal Rules, trial
courts should have discretion in this matter.115
Moreover, in United States v. Miller ,116 the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that the Federal Rules of Evidence make no distinction be-
tween substantive and rehabilitative use of prior consistent state-
ments.117 The court stated that “we fail to see how a statement that
has no probative value in rebutting a charge of ‘recent fabrication
or improper influence or motive’ could possibly have probative
value for the assertedly more ‘limited’ purpose of rehabilitating a
witness.”118 The court concluded that a prior consistent statement
is “admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) . . . .
                                                                                                                 
to fabricate.”) (citing United States v. De Coito, 764 F.2d 690, 694 (9th Cir. 1985)); United
States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1983) (“A prior consistent statement is admissi-
ble to rehabilitate a witness only if made before the witness has a motive to fabricate.”).
Tenth Circuit: United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 350 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he pre-
motive rule is clearly too broad.”), rev’d, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995). For a discussion of the Tome
case, see infra Part IV.
Eleventh Circuit: See United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1567-68 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“[The] argument that . . . prior consistent statements [are] inadmissible because they
were not made before the motive to fabricate arose has repeatedly been rejected by this
circuit.”); United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 942 n.6 (11th Cir. 1988) (same);
United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 915-16 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v.
Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) (following Williams, 573 F.2d at 289
n.3, and Gandy, 469 F.2d at 1135).
D.C. Circuit: See United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1096-98 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(“[The] prior consistent statement need not have preceded the appearance of the motive in
order to render the statement non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B).”).
111. See, e.g., Montague, 958 F.2d at 1098; Miller, 874 F.2d at 1274; Hamilton, 689
F.2d at 1273.
112. See, e.g., Miller, 874 F.2d at 1274; Lawson, 872 F.2d at 182; Williams, 574 F.2d at
289 n.3 (following Gandy, 469 F.2d at 1135).
113. See, e.g., Montague, 958 F.2d at 1098.
114. See, e.g., Tome, 3 F.3d at 350; Montague, 958 F.2d at 1098; Miller, 874 F.2d at
1274; Lawson, 872 F.2d at 182-83.
115. See, e.g., Miller, 874 F.2d at 1274; Lawson, 872 F.2d at 182-83.
116. 874 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1989).
117. See id. at 1272-74.
118. Id. at 1272 (citation omitted). The court based this conclusion on its reasoning
that “[because] the requirement of no prior motive to fabricate is rooted in Rules 402 and
403, and not in the terms of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), there is no basis for limiting the require-
ment to cases involving prior statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B).” Id.
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or it is not admissible at all.”119 The court went on to reject a per se
premotive rule.120
Recognizing the split between the circuits on the admissibility of
postmotive prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the problem.
IV.   THE TOME DECISION
In Tome v. United States ,121 the Supreme Court addressed the
question of “whether out-of-court consistent statements made after
the alleged fabrication, or after the alleged improper influence or
motive arose, are admissible under” Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(B).122 In a 5-4 decision,123 the Court explained that such
statements—postmotive prior consistent statements—are not ad-
missible as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(B).124
A.   The Majority Opinion
The pertinent common-law evidentiary rule that prevailed in the
United States for over a century before the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence was important to the Court’s analysis. The major-
ity defined the common-law premotive rule as holding that “a prior
consistent statement introduced to rebut a charge of recent fabrica-
tion or improper influence or motive was admissible if the statement
had been made before the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive
came into being, but it was inadmissible if made afterwards.”125
In seeking to determine the effect of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence on the common-law rule, the Court looked to the language of
Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The Court found two aspects of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)’s
language especially informing: (1) the language’s focus on one kind
                                                                                                                 
119. Id. at 1273 (footnote omitted). For a further discussion of Miller, see supra notes
93-96 and accompanying text.
120. See Miller, 874 F.2d at 1274.
121. 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995).
122. Id. at 699.
123. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Stevens,
Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg in all but Part II.B, which Justice Scalia did not join. See id.
at 699. Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Thomas. See id. at 706 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. See id. at
706 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
124. See id. at 705.
125. Id. at 700 (emphasis added) (citing Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439
(1836) (“[W]here the testimony is assailed as a fabrication of a recent date . . . in order to
repel such imputation, proof of the antecedent declaration of the party may be admitted.”));
see also People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710, 712 (N.Y. 1949). The majority also cited the trea-
tises of Professor McCormick and Dean Wigmore. See Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 700 (citing
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 49, at 105 (2d ed. 1972); 4 WIGMORE, supra
note 13, § 1128, at 268).
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of impeachment (i.e., rebutting charges of recent fabrication or im-
proper influence or motive), and not on other forms of impeachment;
and (2) Rule 801(b)(1)(B)’s use of wording from common-law cases
describing the premotive rule.126
The Court considered it important that the Advisory Committee
did not give all prior consistent statements nonhearsay status.127 It
emphasized that the Advisory Committee limited the types of prior
consistent statements that receive nonhearsay status to those of-
fered to rebut only one form of impeachment: a charge of “recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive.”128 This limitation, the
Court found, “reinforce[s] the significance of the requirement that
the consistent statements must have been made before the alleged
influence, or motive to fabricate arose.”129
The Court reasoned that the rebuttal force of premotive prior
consistent statements is very strong when introduced to rebut a
charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.130 The
Court, however, explained that little rebuttal force is present when
any prior consistent statement is introduced to rebut other forms of
impeachment, such as character impeachment by misconduct, con-
victions, or bad reputation.131 Likewise, the Court explained, little
rebuttal force is present when postmotive prior consistent state-
ments are introduced to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or im-
proper influence or motive,132 even though such statements may
“suggest in some degree that the testimony did not result from some
improper influence.”133
The Court further reasoned that if Rule 801(d)(1)(B)’s drafters in-
tended to permit admission of postmotive prior consistent state-
ments—which have low rebuttal force—then there is “no sound rea-
son” for the drafters to have expressly limited the use of prior consis-
tent statements to rebut impeachment only when such statements
                                                                                                                 
126. See Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 701-02.
127. See id. at 701.
128. Id. The majority noted that the Advisory Committee used “the same phrase . . . in
its description of the ‘traditiona[l]’ common law of evidence.” Id. (citing FED. R. EVID.
801(d) advisory committee’s note).
129.  Id. The majority rephrased this reasoning: “the forms of impeachment within the
Rule’s coverage are the ones in which the temporal requirement makes the most sense.”
Id.
130. See id. (“A consistent statement that predates the motive is a square rebuttal of
the charge that the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that motive.”).
131. See id. (“[P]rior consistent statements carry little rebuttal force when most other
types of impeachment are involved.”) (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, §
49, at 105 (2d ed. 1972); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1131, at 293).
132. See id. (“[O]ut-of-court statements that postdate the alleged fabrication . . . refute
the charged fabrication in a less direct and forceful way.”).
133. Id. at 702.
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have very high rebuttal force,134 while prohibiting the use of such
statements to rebut other forms of impeachment when such state-
ments have low rebuttal force similar to the low rebuttal force of
postmotive prior consistent statements.135 The Court thus found it
“clear . . . that the drafters of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) were relying upon
the common-law temporal requirement.”136
The Court found support for its analysis by observing that Con-
gress easily could have adopted an evidentiary rule that expressly
allows admission of postmotive prior consistent statements.137 In the
Court’s view, its “analysis is strengthened by the observation that
the somewhat peculiar language of the Rule bears close similarity to
the language used in many of the common-law cases that describe
the premotive requirement.”138 It reasoned that this similarity sup-
ports the conclusion that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) “was intended to carry
over the common-law pre-motive rule.”139
The Court rejected the government’s argument that “the common-
law premotive rule . . . is inconsistent with the Federal Rules’ liberal
approach to relevancy.”140 It noted that because “[r]elevance is not
the sole criterion of admissibility,” relevant out-of-court statements
may still be inadmissible.141
The Court also based its reasoning on the negative aspects of not
having such a rule. It feared that the premotive rule’s absence could
shift a trial’s emphasis from the in-court statements to the out-of-
court statements.142 In addition, the Court stated its belief that the
absence of the premotive rule would increase the burden of the trial
court, and would provide no guidance to attorneys preparing for trial
or to reviewing appellate courts.143
                                                                                                                 
134. Recall that prior consistent statements have very high rebuttal force when used
to rebut impeachment by charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. See
supra note 130 and accompanying text.
135. See Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 702 (explaining that if there is no temporal requirement
“imbedded in” Rule 801(d)(1)(B), then there is “no sound reason not to admit consistent
statements to rebut other forms of impeachment as well”).
136. Id.
137. See id. The majority suggested that a rule that provides that “a witness’ prior
consistent statements are admissible whenever relevant to assess the witness’s truthful-
ness or accuracy” would embody the Government’s theory. Id.
138. Id. at 702 (citing Ohlbaum, supra note 97, at 245 (“Rule 801(d)(1)(B) employs the
precise language—‘rebut[ting] . . . charge[s] . . . of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive’—consistently used in the panoply of pre-1975 decisions.”)); see also Ellicott v.
Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836); Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104 (8th
Cir. 1968); People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710, 711 (N.Y. 1949).
139. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 702.
140. Id. at 704 (“This argument misconceives the design of the Rules’ hearsay provi-
sions.”).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 705.
143. Id. The majority noted that postmotive prior consistent statements could gain
admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) if the statements met Rule 803(24)’s re-
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Four members of the five-justice majority found their analysis
“confirmed by an examination of the Advisory Committee Notes to
the Federal Rules of Evidence.”144 The plurality explained: “Where, as
with Rule 801(d)(1)(B), ‘Congress did not amend the Advisory Com-
mittee’s draft in any way, . . . the Committee’s commentary is particu-
larly relevant in determining the meaning of the document Congress
enacted.’ ”145 The plurality found that the Advisory Committee’s
notes stated a “purpose to adhere to the common law” except where
expressly provided.146 They reasoned that when the Rules departed
from the common law, “in general the Committee said so.”147 The
plurality found no indication from the notes “that Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
abandoned the premotive requirement.”148 Moreover, the plurality
asserted, the Rules demonstrate the Committee’s compromise, one
that the Committee stated was “more of experience than of logic,”149
“between the views expressed by the ‘bulk of the case law . . .
against allowing prior statements of witnesses to be used generally
as substantive evidence’ and the views of the majority of ‘writers . . .
[who] ha[d] taken the opposite position.’ ”150
Based on this analysis, the Court overruled six of the federal cir-
cuits151 and held that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) codified the common-law
premotive rule.152 Thus, following Tome, postmotive prior consistent
statements are not admissible as substantive evidence under Rule
801(d)(1)(B).
B.   The Dissenting Opinion
Four justices, in a dissent authored by Justice Breyer, expressed
their disagreement with the majority opinion. The majority and dis-
senting opinions began from the same point—acknowledgment of the
traditional common-law rule—but quickly parted company.
Although the dissent agreed with the majority’s statement of the
common-law rule,153 the dissent emphasized that the reason for the
                                                                                                                 
quirements. See id. Rule 803(24) is known as the “catch-all exception.” See generally
GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 6775; see also infra note 205.
144. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 702. Justice Scalia did not join in Part II.B of the Court’s
opinion because the majority’s discussion “gives effect to those Notes” as displaying “the
‘purpose’ or ‘inten[t]’ of the draftsmen.” Id. at 706 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 702 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 165-66 n.9
(1988)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 702-03.
148. Id. at 703.
149. Id. at 704.
150. Id. at 703-04 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee’s note).
151. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
152. See Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 700.
153. See id. at 706 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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premotive requirement was that postmotive prior consistent state-
ments had “no relevance to rebut the charge.”154 This point of depar-
ture served as the basis for the Court’s fracture in this case.
The dissent characterized the majority’s holding as finding that a
hearsay-related rule—Rule 801(d)(1)(B)—codified a common-law
relevancy rule, and asserted that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) “has nothing to
do with relevance. Rather, that Rule carves out a subset of prior
consistent statements that were formerly admissible only to reha-
bilitate a witness.”155
The dissent rejected the majority’s premise that the Advisory
Committee “singled out one category” of rehabilitative prior consis-
tent statements for nonhearsay treatment because of the category’s
high probative force.156 It pointed out that other categories also have
high probative force in certain situations, including prior consistent
statements used to rebut a charge of faulty memory.157 The dissent
further argued that, doubts regarding the majority’s premise aside,
the majority’s holding did not follow from such a premise.158 It as-
serted that hearsay law basically turns on the reliability of the out-
of-court statement, and not its probative force.159 It agreed that
postmotive statements may weaken probative force, but asserted
that the reliability of such statements is not reduced.160 Thus, the
dissent concluded that “from a hearsay perspective, the timing of a
prior consistent statement is basically beside the point.”161
The dissent also rejected the majority’s “no sound reason” analy-
sis.162 The dissent noted that “[j]uries have trouble distinguishing
between the rehabilitative and substantive use of ” prior consistent
statements admitted to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or im-
proper influence or motive (i.e., the type of statements covered in
Rule 801(d)(1)(B)).163 The dissent observed that the Advisory Com-
                                                                                                                 
154. Id. The dissent noted that the treatises discuss the issue “under the general
heading of ‘impeachment and support’ (McCormick) or ‘relevancy’ (Wigmore), and not
‘hearsay.’ ” Id. at 706-07.
155. Id. at 707.
156. Id.
157. See id. “ ‘[I]f the witness’s accuracy of memory is challenged, it seems clear com-
mon sense that a consistent statement made shortly after the event and before he had time
to forget, should be received in support.’ ” Id. (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 31, § 49, at 105 n.88 (2d ed. 1972)) (alteration in original).
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. See id. The majority’s “no sound reason” analysis is described supra notes 134-36
and accompanying text.
163. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 707 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 38, ¶ 801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-188 (“[A]s a practical matter, the jury in all prob-
ability would misunderstand or ignore a limiting instruction [with respect to the class of
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mittee may have recognized this difficulty and made such state-
ments nonhearsay as an acknowledgment of the realities of a jury
trial.164 It contended that the drafters may have excluded other cate-
gories of prior consistent statements from nonhearsay status—and
thus from dual rehabilitative and substantive use status—because
other categories cause less jury confusion.165 Thus, the dissent in-
ferred that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) “singled out one category” because the
Advisory Committee felt that juries could more easily separate the
rehabilitative and substantive use of other categories of prior consis-
tent statements—generally with an instruction from the trial
court—than juries could separate the rehabilitative and substantive
use of prior consistent statements admitted to rebut a charge of re-
cent fabrication or improper influence or motive.166 Thus, the dissent
found, this is a concession “more of experience than of logic,” and is a
sound hearsay-related reason for singling out one category.167 Based
on this analysis, the dissent concluded that “there is no basis for
distinguishing between pre and postmotive statements, for the con-
fusion with respect to each would very likely be the same.”168
The dissent, like the majority, found support in Rule
801(d)(1)(B)’s lack of explicit direction on the issue. The dissent rea-
soned that “if the drafters had wanted to insulate the common-law
rule from the Rules’ liberalizing effect, this would have been a re-
markably indirect (and therefore odd) way of doing so.”169
Finding that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) did not codify the premotive rule,
the dissent went on to determine that the common-law premotive
rule did not stand as an absolute bar to the admission of a postmo-
tive prior consistent statement used to rebut a charge of recent fab-
rication or improper influence or motive.170 The dissent based this
conclusion on (1) its observation that postmotive prior consistent
statements are sometimes relevant; and (2) the Federal Rules’ lib-
eralization of relevancy.
The dissent found circumstances where the premotive rule’s “no
relevancy” premise is false. The dissent provided an example: “A
speaker might be moved to lie to help an acquaintance. But, suppose
the circumstances also make clear to the speaker that only the truth
will save his child’s life.”171 The speaker may then be “affected by a
                                                                                                                 
prior consistent statements covered by the Rule] anyway, so there is no good reason for
giving one.”)).
164. See id. at 707-08.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 707-08.
167. Id. at 708 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee’s note).
168. Id. at 708.
169. Id. at 709.
170. See id. at 709-10.
171. Id. at 708.
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far more powerful motive to tell the truth.”172 The dissent also noted
that the common-law premotive rule was not followed uniformly.173
It found no explanation for why courts enforced an absolute premo-
tive common-law rule.174
The dissent noted that the Federal Rules made relevancy more
flexible than the common-law rules.175 It analogized the premotive
rule to the Frye test. The Frye test “excluded scientific evidence that
had not gained general acceptance in the relevant field.”176 It noted
the similarities between the Frye rule and the premotive rule: “ ‘rigid,’
[and] setting forth an ‘absolute prerequisite to admissibility.’ ”177 The
dissent reasoned that “Daubert suggests that the liberalized rele-
vancy provisions of the Federal Rules can supersede a pre-existing
rule of relevance, at least where no compelling practical or logical
support can be found for the pre-existing rule.”178
Based on this analysis, the dissent would have held “that the
Federal Rules authorize a district court to allow (where probative in
respect to rehabilitation) the use of postmotive prior consistent
statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, improper influ-
ence or motive (subject of course to, for example, Rule 403).”179 When
allowed, the dissent explained, such admission would be as sub-
stantive evidence.180
V.   OBSERVATIONS REGARDING RULE 801(D)(1)(B) AND THE CURRENT
PREMOTIVE RULE
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence has generated
considerable confusion since its enactment. Some commentators
have called for the Rule’s amendment and have suggested
changes.181 These commentators, however, do not provide for the
admission of postmotive prior consistent statements under Rule
801(d)(1)(B).
As the Tome Court explained, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) codified a per se
time-line premotive rule.182 Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should be amended.
                                                                                                                 
172. Id.
173. See id. (citing United States v. Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134, 1135 (5th Cir. 1972); Copes
v. United States, 345 F.2d 723, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1964); State v. George, 30 N.C. 324, 328
(1848)).
174. See id.
175. See id. at 709.
176. Id. (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
177. Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993)
(finding the Frye test “at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules”)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 709-10.
180. See id. at 710.
181. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 1; Ohlbaum, supra note 97.
182. See 115 S. Ct. at 702.
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Any such amendment should serve at least two purposes. First, the
amendment should reject the per se time-line premotive rule and
allow the admission of prior consistent statements where the state-
ments are relevant and have value but are inadmissible under the
Tome Court’s interpretation of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Second, the
amendment should expressly provide for the admission of prior con-
sistent statements as substantive evidence in all cases where such
statements are admissible for rehabilitation.
A.   The Pitfalls of the Per Se Approach
The overwhelming majority of common-law courts applied a per
se time-line premotive rule.183 It is important to understand, how-
ever, why a per se time-line rule developed. Courts reasoned that a
consistent statement made during the time in which the witness al-
legedly had the same motivation that resulted in the impeached in-
court statement has no rebuttal force and is thus irrelevant.184 In the
vast majority of cases, a strict time-line rule furthers this rationale.
Consequently, the rule developed into a per se time-line rule because
such a rule is properly determinative in the great majority of cases
in which the issue of temporalness and prior consistent statements
arise, and theoretically provides predictability and facilitates the
decision-making process.
Common-law courts applying the rule shortly before the devel-
opment and codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence sensed
that something was wrong with the per se time-line premotive
rule.185 This sense had not fully developed when the Federal Rules of
Evidence were enacted. As a result, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) codified, as the
Tome Court explained, the common-law rule accepted by the vast
majority of courts, including the time-line premotive requirement.186
Courts’ wariness of the time-line premotive rule continued and
expanded under the Federal Rules. Several courts applying Rule
801(d)(1)(B) before Tome allowed the admission of postmotive prior
consistent statements as substantive evidence under the Rule in
some instances.187 Moreover, all but one of the circuits admitted
                                                                                                                 
183. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1972); Hanger
v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104-05 (8th Cir. 1968); Copes v. United States, 345 F.2d 723,
725-26 (D.C. Cir. 1964); see also United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 566 (2d Cir.
1956), rev’d on other grounds, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
186. See 115 S. Ct. at 702.
187. See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
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postmotive prior consistent statements for the limited purpose of re-
habilitation in some instances.188
Courts and commentators have become overly focused on a pure
time-line analysis when examining prior consistent statements.
While it is true that the time-line premotive rule comports to un-
adorned logic, in practical application the rule’s per se approach can
be overly restrictive.
There are situations where a postmotive prior consistent state-
ment is relevant, has some rebuttal force or related value, and
should be admissible. One such time is when a separate motive to
tell the truth or to make a different statement exists at the state-
ment’s making. Consider a situation where the declarant has been
impeached by a charge of improper influence or motive arising at a
particular time. Normally (and logically), a statement that is made
after the time the improper influence or motive arose and is consis-
tent with the declarant’s in-court testimony offers no rebuttal value
and is irrelevant. However, if the postmotive prior consistent state-
ment is made when a separate motive to tell the truth or to make a
different statement exists, the postmotive prior consistent statement
may offer some rebuttal force. The Tome dissent provided examples
of this situation:
A speaker might be moved to lie to help an acquaintance. But,
suppose the circumstances also make clear to the speaker that
only the truth will save his child’s life. Or, suppose the postmotive
statement was made . . . when the speaker’s motive to lie was
much weaker than it was at trial.189
The dissent explained that “[i]n these and similar situations, special
circumstances may indicate that the prior statement was made for
some reason other than the alleged improper motivation; it may
have been made not because of, but despite, the improper motiva-
tion.”190
If a motivation to tell the truth or to make a different statement
at the time the prior consistent statement was made appears greater
than or equal to the strength of the improper influence or motivation
charged at the statement’s making, the prior consistent statement
may have some rebuttal force or related value, may be relevant, and
should be admissible. Any amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should
                                                                                                                 
188. See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
prior consistent statements are admissible as substantive evidence or not at all. See supra
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United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1274 (9th Cir. 1989).
189. 115 S. Ct. at 708 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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provide for this situation. A jury is fully capable of making this as-
sessment and should be permitted to do so.
Another situation where a postmotive prior consistent statement
is relevant, has some rebuttal force or related value, and should be
admissible, is when the charged motive is contextually weak. For
example, consider a situation where a criminal defendant alleges
that a large number of police officers are conspiring to frame the de-
fendant. The defendant impliedly charges that the officers are lying
on the stand about their investigation, and charges that the im-
proper motivation arose as soon as each officer arrived on the crime
scene. Should such a charge prevent the officers from being rehabili-
tated by showing that they made prior consistent statements from
the beginning of their investigation? Would not their consistency
tend to show the absence of such a conspiracy even though the prior
consistent statements were made after the alleged conspiracy be-
gan?
Still another example where the charged motive may be contex-
tually weak and the postmotive prior consistent statement would
have some rebuttal force or related value was cited by the Tome dis-
sent: postmotive statements made spontaneously.191 Circumstances
may reveal that any alleged effect of the charged motive on the de-
clarant was greatly weakened by the reliability evidenced by the
statement’s spontaneity. The statement could serve to rebut a
charge of improper motive and its admissibility should be deter-
mined in context.
There are other situations where postmotive prior consistent
statements may have some value and should be admissible. A de-
clarant’s ability to tell a complicated or unique story more than once
may, in some instances, indicate reliability and be relevant. Child
sex-abuse cases are one example of this situation. A young child’s
postmotive description of the details of sexual abuse can offer some
value and indicate that the child is not fabricating the story. A jury
is able to weigh these possibilities in context and should be allowed
to do so.
In addition, in a situation when a witness testifies as to his or her
own prior consistent statement, the jury’s ability to view the witness
testifying offers more than the statement itself. It gives the jurors
another opportunity to observe the witness and judge the witness’s
credibility.
It is important to note that in most cases, postmotive prior con-
sistent statements will be inadmissible under the relevancy rules for
the reasons originally noted by courts developing common-law evi-
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dentiary rules.192 The suggestions made in this Article will not
change the result in the vast majority of situations, but will refocus
the inquiry regarding the admission of prior consistent statements
where it belongs—on relevancy.
An argument can be made that anything but a time-line rule
leaves some uncertainty in the parties’ pre-trial preparation. How-
ever, this potential uncertainty does not outweigh the need to allow
the jury to consider relevant matters. Moreover, rejecting the time-
line rule would leave no more uncertainty than is present with the
current rule. The parties cannot know exactly how the court will
rule in regard to relevancy or the premotive or postmotive status of a
prior consistent statement. This is particularly evident in the many
co-defendant-turned-state’s-evidence cases. Whether the trial court
will find that the co-defendant’s motive arose when he or she was
first approached by the government, after a deal was put on paper,
or at some other time, seems nearly impossible to predict ahead of
the ruling.193 Similarly, witnesses’ uncertainty of dates and wavering
testimony will often leave pre-trial predictions on the admissibility
of a prior consistent statement difficult.
The per se premotive rule also results in administrative problems
that hamper the fact-finding process. Sometimes, a trial judge may
find that the motive arose and the prior consistent statement was
made on particular dates when a different fact-finder could rea-
sonably choose different dates. This results in a trial judge some-
times finding a prior consistent statement to be made postmotive
when a jury could reasonably find it to be made premotive, or vice-
versa. Prior consistent statements that may rehabilitate should not
be excluded in such circumstances. This situation could be rectified
by using the Second Circuit’s Grunewald standard: If it is
“reasonably possible for the jury to say that the prior consistent
statements did in fact antedate the motive disclosed on the cross-
examination, the court should not exclude them.”194 This standard
acknowledges that the determination of a prior consistent state-
ment’s admissibility is often too crucial to deprive the jury of
weighing the statement and determining its value when reasonable
minds could differ on the timing of events. Although the use of this
rule would be a step in the right direction, it is not enough to solve
the numerous other problems with the per se premotive rule.
Additionally, it is often difficult for the trial court to pin down the
date when a charged improper influence or motive arose or the date
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when a statement was made. Frequently, and particularly in crimi-
nal drug trials, witnesses cannot remember even the month in which
a particular event occurred. Evidence concerning when an improper
influence or motive arose and when a particular prior consistent
statement was made may be scant. The trial judge should be free to
allow the jury to weigh the evidence under all the circumstances
without being bound by a restrictive time-line rule.
These problems with the per se time-line rule have, on occasion,
resulted in some legal gymnastics on the issue of when a motive
arose. For example, in United States v. Henderson ,195 the defendant
impeached the government’s informant by charging that the infor-
mant fabricated his allegations against the defendant in return for
leniency.196 On redirect, the trial court admitted the informant’s
prior consistent statements made after arrest but before the infor-
mant and the government reached a plea agreement.197 On appeal,
the defendant argued that such admission was error. The Fourth
Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument. The court reasoned that
the defendant’s argument “effectively swallows the rule with respect
to prior consistent statements made to government officers: by defi-
nition such statements would never be prior to the event of appre-
hension or investigation by the government which gave rise to a
motive to falsify.”198 The court explained that “[s]uch a result also
would render superfluous our [previous] distinction . . . between
statements made to police after arrest but before a bargain and
statements made after an agreement is reached. We decline to so
eviscerate Rule 801(d)(1)(B).”199 Thus, the arrestee-declarant’s prior
consistent statements made after arrest but before the government
and the arrestee-declarant reach a plea agreement are admissible
under the Henderson rule, while such statements made post-
agreement are not.
In many cases, it is doubtful that a motive to fabricate suddenly
changes upon the signing of an agreement. It seems much more
likely that the motive to fabricate was the same before and after the
agreement. In such instances, a pre-agreement (or premotive per
Henderson) prior consistent statement offers little that a post-
agreement (or postmotive) prior consistent statement does not. The
parties, and the jury, would be better served if the court could con-
sider the admissibility of a proffered prior consistent statement in
relation to all of the circumstances of the particular case.
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When considering the admissibility of prior consistent state-
ments, courts’ attention should be directed toward the charged mo-
tive, its context, and all of its characteristics, not merely the mo-
tive’s alleged birthday. When the characteristics and context of a
prior consistent statement, including a postmotive prior consistent
statement, indicate that the statement is relevant to the juries’ con-
sideration of a witness’s credibility, or to other relevant issues, the
statement should be admissible.
B.   Admissibility of Prior Consistent Statements Outside of Rule
801(d)(1)(B)
Any amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) also should clarify the
question of the admissibility of prior consistent statements outside
of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). This is particularly important because, before
Tome, all circuits but the Ninth Circuit held postmotive prior consis-
tent statements admissible for the limited purpose of rehabilitation.
Many of these courts explained that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) did not govern
such statements.
Some commentators and the Ninth Circuit reason that the draft-
ers of the Federal Rules meant to provide that prior consistent
statements are admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or not at all.200 Of
course, statements that are not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted are not hearsay by definition. Thus, logically, there would
be no reason to seek the admission of a statement offered merely for
rehabilitation purposes—and not for the truth of the matter as-
serted—under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Absent a desire to use the state-
ment substantively, there would be no reason to seek to classify as
nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) a statement that is already
outside the definition of hearsay. Therefore, the admission of such a
statement would be governed by the relevancy rules. It would seem
that Rule 801(d)(1)(B), part of Article VIII—the hearsay rules—
would play no part in the calculus. The circuits allowing the admis-
sion of prior consistent statements offered for the limited purpose of
rehabilitation without reference to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) follow the logi-
cal path provided by the Federal Rules.
Any indication that Tome provides in relation to the question of
whether postmotive prior consistent statements offered for the lim-
ited purpose of rehabilitation are admissible is dictum in the classic
sense. It was not necessary for the Supreme Court to decide this
question to reach its decision in Tome. The prior consistent state-
ments at issue in Tome were admitted by the trial court as nonhear-
say under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The statements were not offered for the
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limited purpose of rehabilitation. The government’s brief explained
that “[t]his case does not require the Court to decide whether a pre-
motive rule also applies to prior consistent statements that are not
admitted as substantive evidence, but are used merely to rehabili-
tate a witness.”201 Moreover, the Tome opinion clearly states that
“[o]ur holding is confined to the requirements for admission under
Rule 801(d)(1)(B).”202
After Tome, there are two possible scenarios regarding the ad-
mission of prior consistent statements. The first is that premotive
prior consistent statements are admissible as substantive evidence,
while postmotive prior consistent statements are not admissible for
any purpose. As explained above, this situation is unsatisfactory.
The second scenario is that premotive prior consistent statements
are admissible as substantive evidence, while postmotive prior con-
sistent statements are admissible for the “limited purpose of reha-
bilitation.” This, too, is an unsatisfactory situation.
Distinctions between the substantive and nonsubstantive use of
prior consistent statements are normally distinctions without practi-
cal meaning. Juries have a very difficult time understanding an in-
struction about the difference between substantive and nonsubstan-
tive use. This is likely a large part of the reason that the drafters of
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provided that evidence that meets the Rule’s re-
quirements is admissible substantively.
It makes little sense to differentiate prior consistent statements
with a cumbersome time-line rule in regard to the statements’ ad-
mission as substantive evidence while also allowing the admission of
statements rejected by such a rule when juries normally do not
make such differentiations. Experience shows that jurors are adept
at determining the weight to be given to a witness’s testimony and
can easily recognize the interest a witness has in the matter about
which he or she testified, including any motive that could affect the
witness’s credibility. In recognition of this, the Federal Rules should
explicitly provide that all prior consistent statements, when admis-
sible to rehabilitate, are admissible as substantive evidence. The
weight given these statements would then be for the jury to deter-
mine. Amending Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to account for the issues raised
herein would alleviate the concern over substantive versus limited
rehabilitative use of prior consistent statements, eliminate the often
misunderstood limiting instruction, and make the Rule compatible
with the realities of a jury trial.
Courts have cited other evidence rules in allowing the admission
of postmotive prior consistent statements. Several courts cite Rule
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106 to account for a “completeness” admission of prior consistent
statements.203 Courts have recognized that this is not a precise use
of Rule 106.204 Indeed, it appears that this is not a contemplated use
of Rule 106 at all. However, the admission of a prior consistent
statement to clarify a self-contradiction is often a practical necessity
of trial. Such statements should not be forced through the back door
of Rule 106, but should be explicitly recognized as admissible when
relevant.
As the Tome Court noted, postmotive prior consistent statements,
even though not admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), may be admit-
ted substantively under Rule 803(24)205 if the statements meet Rule
803(24)’s requirements.206 Although this avenue is available, Rule
803(24) does not address the issues raised above. Moreover, it is of-
ten difficult to meet all of Rule 803(24)’s requirements,207 and such
requirements are usually unnecessary when addressing the admis-
sibility of postmotive prior consistent statements. For example,
Rule 803(24)’s notice requirement is normally superfluous in such a
situation because an opposing litigant knows that if a charge of re-
cent fabrication or improper influence or motive is made, prior con-
sistent statements may be admissible. In addition, the notice re-
quirement of Rule 803(24) would require the proponent of a postmo-
tive prior consistent statement to anticipate the opponent’s im-
peachment of the declarant with a charge of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive. Because some courts may continue a
trial in recognition of Rule 803(24)’s notice requirement when a
party seeks to use the rule and has not notified the opposing party
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before trial, the use of Rule 803(24) in this situation could result in
needless delay.208
A charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive is a
serious charge reflecting unfavorably on its recipient. The charging
party is aware that such a charge can open the door to relevant prior
consistent statements that meet the requirements of Rule
801(d)(1)(B). Once that party has opened the door in this manner,
there is no convincing reason not to admit, as substantive evidence,
prior consistent statements that have some value to the jury from a
practical standpoint and that meet the relevancy rules’ require-
ments.
VI.   CONCLUSION
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) is overly restrictive in re-
gard to the admission of prior consistent statements in many in-
stances. The primary example of this problem is the focus of this
Article: postmotive prior consistent statements. Such statements, on
occasion, are relevant and offer sufficient value to warrant their
admission. Nevertheless, Rule 801(d)(1)(B), as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Tome v. United States , provides a per se prohibi-
tion on such statement’s admission as substantive evidence. Rule
801(d)(1)(B) should be amended to allow the admission of a prior
consistent statement as substantive evidence in instances where the
statement is relevant and valuable, but is inadmissible under the
current Federal Rules of Evidence after Tome.
The issue of the admissibility of prior consistent statements has
long been recognized as “perplexing.”209 Much of the confusion arises
from conflict between the theoretical and the practical approaches to
the issue. This tension must be recognized and reconciled or the is-
sue will remain a puzzle. An amendment to the Federal Rules of
Evidence addressing the several observations discussed in this Ar-
ticle would serve to clarify the admissibility of prior consistent
statements and to further the goals of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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